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Should We Protect Animals from Hate
Speech?
†
Josh Milburn * and Alasdair Cochrane **
Abstract—Laws against hate speech protect members of certain human groups.
However, they do not offer protection to nonhuman animals. Using racist hate
speech as our primary example, we explore the discrepancy between the legal re-
sponse to hate speech targeting human groups and what might be called anti-animal
or speciesist hate speech. We explore two sets of possible defences of this legal dis-
crepancy drawn from the philosophical literature on hate speech—non-consequen-
tialist and harm-based—and find both wanting. We thus conclude that, absent a
compelling alternative argument, there is no in-principle reason to support the cen-
sure of racist hate speech but not the censure of speciesist hate speech.
Keywords: hate speech, hate crime, free speech, animal rights, animal ethics, ani-
mal law.
1. Introduction
Imagine a group—let us call them the ‘White Defence League’ (WDL)—who
distribute leaflets in a residential area. In their leaflets, the WDL decry the
‘propaganda’ spread by anti-racists and argue that white people are morally su-
perior to those of other races. They further argue that white people should pri-
oritise other white people—even if that means ignoring the exploitation,
suffering and death of non-white people. If the WDL were operating in a lib-
eral state with laws against ‘hate speech’, it is not hard to imagine that its
members would face criminal prosecution for distributing the leaflets.1 In the
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1 The WDL are fictional, but there have been many convictions in liberal states for the distribution of racist
leaflets. Among the motley claims of convicted racists are implicit or explicit assertions of inequality between
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UK, for example, members of the WDL might face prosecution for the distri-
bution of ‘written material which is threatening, abusive or insulting’, that, re-
gardless of the intent of the distributors, is likely to stir up ‘racial hatred’.2
But now imagine a different group, which we could call the ‘Human
Defence League’ (HDL). The HDL also distribute leaflets in that same resi-
dential area. In their leaflets, they decry the ‘propaganda’ spread by animal-
rights and vegan activists, and argue that humans are morally superior to other
animals. They further argue that humans should prioritise other humans—
even if that means ignoring the exploitation, suffering and death of non-
human animals. While the claims and arguments of the HDL are very similar
to the claims and arguments of the WDL—except, of course, that they are
decrying animals, rather than non-white people—the HDL would not be sub-
ject to censure under hate-speech laws in the UK or any other liberal state.
There is thus a discrepancy between the legal response we could expect to
the WDL’s and HDL’s respective leafleting campaigns. Our question is
whether such a discrepancy is justified in criminal law. As such, we put to one
side the related but separate questions concerning, first, whether hate-speech
laws are justified at all (more on this shortly); second, the morality of engaging
in hateful speech (ie engaging in hate speech may involve many wrongs
whether or not it is the law’s business); and, third, the possibility of non-crim-
inal legal means for challenging hate speech.3 In this article, we will explore
several potential justifications for the discrepancy, ultimately concluding that
none of them are successful. This leads to the conclusion that, in principle,
there is no reason to believe that members of the WDL should face criminal
sanction while members of the HDL should not. Unless a better justification
for the discrepancy can be identified, either both (in principle) should face
sanction or neither should.
Before exploring reasons for endorsing the discrepancy in earnest, we want
to note two things. First, we acknowledge that, for some readers, even asking
this question is distasteful, given historical and contemporary uses of animalis-
ing and dehumanising insults against non-white people. In response, we first
note that the purpose of this article is absolutely not to equate the moral
worth of non-white people with that of animals. We acknowledge that there
are important differences between humans (of all races) and animals, and the
races, accusations of propagandising, and arguments about how one should prioritise the welfare of their fav-
oured group. These are exactly the kinds of claims made by the WDL. For just one recent example, see R v
Sheppard & Whittle (2010) EWCA Crim 65. For a more recent case which has resulted in much discussion, see
‘Britain First Leader and Deputy Leader Jailed for Hate Crimes’ (BBC News, 7 March 2018) <www.bbc.co.uk/
news/uk-england-43320121> accessed 13 May 2020.
2 Public Order Act 1986, s 19.
3 Not all laws governing hate speech are criminal. For example, the law of tort could be leveraged against
perpetrators of (putative or actual, criminal or non-criminal) hate speech. In the United States, where hate
speech is not criminally sanctioned, some people targeted by hateful speech have successfully pursued damages
under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Alexander Brown, Hate Speech Law (Routledge
2015) 32–3, 52–3.


















































































nature and kind of injustices they face. We are interested only in the narrow
question of what relevant differences there might be between the two for the
purposes of hate-speech law, including differences in the impact that hate speech
directed at these respective groups might have. We further note that the power
of animalising language rests upon the fact that animals are themselves mar-
ginalised. If animals were afforded the respect that we (the authors) believe
they are due, these insults would lose their rhetorical strength.4 We finally
note that this comparison is intended to be a starting point to explore compar-
isons between hate speech targeting human minorities—racial, gender, sexual,
religious and so on—and what we might call anti-animal or ‘speciesist’ hate
speech. The specific comparison is not an end in itself.
The second consideration that we want to acknowledge is that there is al-
ready controversy about how, if at all, states can justify laws against hate
speech, as well as what constitutes hate speech. To reiterate, the purpose of
this article is not to take a stance on the question of justification. And yet, in
exploring possible rationales for the discrepancy outlined, we will naturally
examine a range of possible justifications for hate-speech laws. And though we
acknowledge that there are difficult questions about the line between ‘merely’
hurtful speech and speech that could fairly be called hate speech, we wish to
put that question aside. We are here focusing on the core question of whether
one can distinguish paradigmatic forms of hate speech—racist, sexist, homo-
phobic, ableist, etc—from what we might call anti-animal or ‘speciesist’ hate
speech. Thus, we are not going to attempt to offer a definition or conception
of hate speech, speciesist or otherwise, beyond noting that ‘hate speech’ is
often thought to include material that is neither (in the colloquial sense) hate-
ful nor speech.5 For now, we simply ask that readers allow that the WDL’s
actions would typically be viewed as hate speech, while the HDL’s—though
structurally identical—would not.
But while a precise definition of hate speech is not to be offered, it is rea-
sonable to ask what kinds of anti-animal speech are motivating this enquiry.
Some current practices that strike us as potential examples of speciesist hate
speech include the following. First—and this is the kind of case that inspired
the HDL vignette—pro-animal-agriculture organisations (including govern-
mental organisations) publishing literature or films claiming that great harms
inflicted on animals should be tolerated or ignored for the sake of seemingly
less weighty human interests. Second, articles written by avowedly speciesist
critics of animal protectionism claiming that animals’ interests do not matter
simply because they belong to animals. Third, the public campaigning of
4 Joan Dunayer, ‘Sexist Words, Speciesist Roots’ in Carol J Adams and Josephine Donovan (eds), Animals
and Women: Feminist Theoretical Explorations (Duke UP 1995).
5 The homophobic pastor may sincerely claim that he does not hate homosexuals, he simply wants to save
them. And, as our opening examples show, hate speech can refer to written words just as readily as it can spo-
ken words. See Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Harvard UP 2012) ch 3.


















































































conservationists built upon explicit declarations that the lives and suffering of
members of certain non-native animal species matter less than the lives and
suffering of members of native animal species. While each of these instances
has a clear analogy in the case of hate speech targeting humans, each also
brings with it its own particular conceptual and normative puzzles, which
there is not space to explore fully here. Though these examples help motivate
the enquiry, it might be the case that not all do (or should) constitute ‘hate
speech’ proper.6
This article advances by examining a variety of different ways in which the
legal discrepancy in responses to the WDL’s and HDL’s leafleting might be
justified. We split these into two groups. The first section explores what we
refer to as ‘non-consequentialist’ defences of the discrepancy—in that they jus-
tify the differential treatment in terms unrelated to the impact that the speech
has (or is likely to have).7 The second addresses defences of the discrepancy
grounded in claims about harm resulting from hateful speech. Our conclusion
will be that none of the reasons to defend the discrepancy canvassed are satis-
factory, leading to the conclusion that either both the WDL and the HDL
should be open to censure or neither should.
2. Non-consequentialist Defences of the Discrepancy
A. Veracity
One way to differentiate between the speech of the WDL and the HDL is via
the veracity of their claims. Perhaps the claims in the WDL’s leaflets are un-
true, while the claims in the HDL’s leaflets are true. Or, alternatively, perhaps
the claims in the WDL’s leaflet are not only false but indefensible, while the
claims in the HDL’s leaflet—whether true or false—are at least defensible.
There are at least two problems with this line of reasoning. The first is that
it is question-begging. The WDL and their supporters, at least, are presum-
ably going to deny that their claims are wrong—and are certainly going to
deny that their claims are indefensible, even if anti-racists may say that they
are. Meanwhile, plenty of animal liberationists and anti-speciesists will deny
that the HDL’s claims are right, and may be prepared to claim that they are
indefensible. In response, it might be observed that decisions must be made
about rightness and wrongness (or defensibility and indefensibility) for the
idea of hate-speech legislation to have plausibility at all. That is, the untruth-
fulness (or indefensibility) of the WDL’s claims (as determined in some demo-
cratically appropriate way) might seem to be a prerequisite for labelling their
6 It is at least possible, for example, that we should protect animals from hate speech, but that (for whatever
reason) none of these things constitute hate speech.
7 We are not committed to the claim that harm-based defences are necessarily tied up with consequentialist
moral theory, but they are concerned broadly with the negative consequences of hate speech.


















































































activities hate speech.8 This response can be countered by observing that
those whose status is disputed could be more in need of the protection of hate-
speech legislation than are those whose status is assured (for more on this, see
our discussion of Waldron below). It seems confused, for example, to offer the
protection of hate-speech legislation to members of a dominant racial group
on the grounds that all in the demos recognise the equal status of members of
that group, but deny it to racial minorities on the grounds that many in the
demos are racists. In effect, this gets the matter the wrong way around.
The second problem is that there is something deeply illiberal about censur-
ing the expression of a view simply because the view is wrong, or even in-
defensible—or, more precisely, deemed to be wrong or indefensible. John
Stuart Mill, for example, famously argues in defence of freedom of speech re-
gardless of the rightness or wrongness of the expressed view.9 Censured views,
he argues, may be true, meaning they should be adopted; may contain a por-
tion of the truth, meaning they should be heard, so that prevailing opinion
can develop; or may be untrue, meaning they should be heard, so that the
truth of the received opinion may be earnestly felt, and the received opinion
does not become mere ‘dead dogma’. And, in any case, we have no way of
knowing whether views are untrue until they have been heard. (And we cannot
say that we know they are wrong because we have heard them before; we have
no way of knowing that we have heard them before without hearing them this
time.) For Mill, the state can interfere with an individual’s freedom of
speech—indeed, any action of an individual—only when the interference will
protect others from (wrongful) harm.
With a few notable exceptions, Mill does not believe that the expression of
an opinion can be harmful—and he is unlikely to see the actions of the WDL
or the HDL as harmful.10 (We may want to challenge this view, and we will
explore reasons for thinking that the WDL’s actions are harmful later in the
article.) But let us put aside the suggestion that the discrepancy between the
WDL and the HDL can be justified by the accuracy or defensibility of their
respective views.
There is, perhaps, a more sophisticated version of this argument that says
that speciesist speech (even if untrue) is within the space of reasonable or le-
gitimate public debate, while racist speech is not. This idea is usefully
explored through the idea of public reason. John Rawls holds that the burdens
of judgment (the challenges leading reasonable people to make different
8 We thank both Jasmine Gunkel and an anonymous reviewer for this journal for pressing us on this issue.
9 John Stuart Mill, ‘On Liberty’ in John Gray (ed), On Liberty and Other Essays (first published 1859, OUP
2008) ch II.
10 cf Alexander Brown, ‘The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006: A Millian Response’ (2008) 11 Critical
Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 1. Some have argued that Mill’s defence of free speech
need not cover forms of speech—perhaps including instances of hate speech—that do not contribute to the de-
velopment of deliberative capacities. See eg David O Brink, ‘Millian Principles, Freedom of Expression, and
Hate Speech’ (2001) 7 LEG 119.


















































































judgments about ethical matters) and the consequent fact of reasonable plural-
ism (the existence of a plurality of reasonable views) mean reasonable dis-
agreement will persist in a liberal society.11 So, Rawls (himself a vegetarian)
might have said that reasonable people will continue to disagree about the
moral worth of animals. But there are some things that no reasonable person
would disagree with, such as the equal moral status of human beings; these
are not the subject of reasonable disagreement in a liberal society. What is
more, human rights are a matter of basic justice, while the rights of animals
are not. This gives us a clear difference between the actions of the WDL and
the actions of the HDL. The HDL are contributing to legitimate public de-
bate about a controversial issue, one that steps beyond matters of basic justice
into (understood in a Rawlsian sense) metaphysics. The WDL, on the other
hand, are not making such a contribution: the things they are discussing are
beyond reasonable disagreement, and are a matter of basic justice.
Drawing on this distinction, one could construct argument saying that while
the state has no business restricting freedom of speech—a Rawlsian basic lib-
erty—when the speech concerns a matter of reasonable disagreement, speech
on matters beyond reasonable disagreement could, in principle, be
restricted.12 Thus, the state could legitimately restrict the WDL’s speech but
not the HDL’s speech.
We believe that there are two important responses to this position. The first
would be to simply regard Rawls’s specific conceptions of public reason and
basic justice as inappropriate for the present question. After all, the idea that
animals’ rights are a subject of public debate while humans’ rights are not is
built into the idea of public reason and ‘reasonableness’. Federico Zuolo
explains that the idea of public reason presupposes that human persons (to
whom positions must be justified) have rights, but leaves as an open question
whether animals have rights.13 But such presuppositions seem to simply stack
the deck against animals. The alternative view is that we need to ‘accept a new
form of reasonableness’, according to which views not sufficiently respectful of
animals are deemed unreasonable, just as views not sufficiently respectful of
members of racial minorities are.14 This need not mean that Rawls was wrong,
but simply that standards of reasonableness can change.15 Maybe we are now
more aware of the status of animals, or perhaps instead what the animal advo-
cate must hope is ‘for a sufficient consensus on the worth of animals to
emerge at some point in the future’.16 If that is the case, then the present
11 See John Rawls Political Liberalism (first published 1995, Columbia UP 2003) passim.
12 For a Rawlsian argument for restrictions on speech, see eg Matteo Bonotti, ‘Political Liberalism, Free
Speech and Public Reason’ (2014) 14 European Journal of Political Theory 180. Bonotti ties his arguments
about enforcing the Rawlsian duty of civility to Jeremy Waldron’s Rawlsian case for the criminalisation of hate
speech, discussed later in the present article.
13 Federico Zuolo, Animals, Political Liberalism and Public Reason (Palgrave Macmillan 2020) 79–82.
14 Alasdair Cochrane, Sentientist Politics: A Theory of Global Inter-Species Justice (OUP 2018) 104.
15 Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Harvard UP 2006) 388.
16 Cochrane (n 14) 105.


















































































article can be read as philosophy of law for a more ideal world. (This thought
will be returned to below.)
An alternative response would be to accept (something like) Rawls’s concep-
tion of reasonableness, but maintain that views regarding animals as lacking
any status are unreasonable.17 And, if the HDL are spreading these views, then
their conduct is (according to the present line of thought) somewhat analo-
gous to the actions of the WDL. It has been argued, for instance, that oppos-
ition to animal cruelty is a kind of fixed point in public reason18 (much as
anti-slavery is a fixed point) or that animal welfare laws are supported by an
overlapping consensus19 (much as human rights are supported by an overlap-
ping consensus). Rejecting these things could thus be a kind of anti-animal
hate speech. Consequently, on this alternative response to the public-reason
argument, while some examples of speech that could be labelled ‘hateful’ to-
wards animals would be justifiable and within the realm of public reason,
others would not. Some instances of supposed anti-animal hate speech would
therefore warrant criminal censure analogous to the criminal censure war-
ranted by racist hate speech (if any), but other instances of supposed anti-ani-
mal hate speech would not.
For present purposes, we are not interested in adjudicating between these
two responses. Our point is simply that while the public-reason case may point
to disanalogies between the actions of the HDL and the WDL, it does not jus-
tify rejection of the idea that animals warrant the protection of hate-speech
laws (if humans do).
B. Race and Species Are Not Analogous
Another means by which some might defend the discrepancy would be to
argue that while the form of the speech of the WDL and the HDL is compar-
able, the content of their speech is completely different. Non-white people (like
members of some other denigrated groups in society) are appropriately pro-
tected by hate-speech laws because of the kind of thing race is; members of
denigrated species are not protected, on the other hand, because of the kind
of thing species is. For this reason, race and species are not analogous. (Note
that this is a different argument to that discussed in the previous subsection.
It concerns not the rightness or wrongness of the positions of the WDL and
the HDL, but the different kinds of things they are making claims about.)
We acknowledge that race and species are not the same thing—but note
that the existence of difference does not undermine the possibility of making
certain legitimate analogies between them. And let us remember that hate-
17 Zuolo (n 13) ch 4.
18 Chad Flanders, ‘Public Reason and Animal Rights’ in Marcel Wissenburg and David Schlosberg (eds),
Political Animals and Animal Politics (Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 56.
19 Kimberly Smith, ‘A Public Philosophy for the Liberal Animal Welfare State’ in Robert Garner and
Siobhan O’Sullivan (eds), The Political Turn in Animal Ethics (Rowman & Littlefield International 2016).


















































































speech laws already protect people from hateful speech targeting many differ-
ent characteristics. Depending on the jurisdiction, for instance, they may pro-
tect individuals from abuse directed at their religion, sex, sexual orientation,
physical or mental abilities, and so on. The pertinent question is whether
there is a morally salient difference between race and species that justifies treat-
ing race, but not species, as a protected characteristic under hate-speech law.
If there is, it will be due to a ‘formal’ specification of the kinds of groups that
are appropriately protected by hate-speech laws.
Drawing upon existing scholarly and legislative discussions, Alexander
Brown identifies five formal specifications used to delineate the characteristics
worthy or unworthy of protection in hate-speech law: (i) immutable versus
changeable characteristics; (ii) chosen versus unchosen characteristics; (iii)
constitutive versus peripheral characteristics; (iv) internal-life versus external-
life characteristics; and (v) characteristics we all share versus characteristics we
do not all share.20 The idea is that these distinctions provide (in the eyes of
their advocates) morally salient ways to delineate traits that are eligible for
protection via hate speech laws with reference to features of the traits them-
selves. For example, in the eyes of some commentators on hate-speech legisla-
tion, it would be non-arbitrary to protect people from hate speech targeting
them as members of a group with a particular immutable characteristic (eg
people born in a particular country), while not protecting them from (puta-
tive) hate speech targeting them as members of a group with a particular mut-
able characteristic (eg people employed by a particular company). If it were
the case that race and species fell on different sides of these various distinc-
tions, then we might have an in-principle justification for the discrepancy in
responses to the WDL and the HDL. As such, these formal criteria are worth
reviewing.
Two distinctions can be put aside relatively easily. The idea that a character-
istic that is (relatively or absolutely) changeable (eg religion) is less eligible for
protection than a characteristic that is (relatively or absolutely) immutable (eg
sex) will not serve to distinguish species from race. It seems clear that just as
one cannot generally go through multiple races in one’s life, one cannot gener-
ally go through multiple species; both are, then, ‘immutable’. The distinction
between ‘chosen’ versus ‘unchosen’ characteristics also fails to distinguish spe-
cies from race, for while some might claim that (say) political affiliation is less
worthy of protection in hate-speech laws than (say) race, on the basis that the
former is (largely) chosen and the latter is (largely) unchosen, the distinction
does not apply to species and race. Just as we do not generally choose our race,
so we do not and cannot choose our species.
20 Alexander Brown, ‘The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate. Part 1. Consistency, Practical, and
Formal Approaches’ (2016) 29 CJLJ 275, 301.


















































































The internal life versus external life distinction pushes in the opposite direc-
tion to those addressed in the previous paragraph. One’s ‘inner life’ concerns
‘inner thoughts, feelings, beliefs, desires, and even understandings of the
meaning of life and of the type of people it is good to be’.21 Thus, one’s reli-
gious belief (minimally, an element thereof) is a paradigm example of an
inner-life characteristic. One’s external life, on the other hand, ‘has to do with
outward appearances, and with how people are presented to, and interact
with, other people’.22 Thus, one’s race is a paradigm example of an external-
life characteristic. Somewhat in contrast to the conclusions reached above,
advocates of this distinction present external-life characteristics as less worthy
of the legal protection afforded by hate-speech legislation than internal-life
characteristics. Nonetheless, it seems clear that this distinction is not useful
for distinguishing species from race: both are paradigmatic external-life
characteristics.
Another distinction is sometimes made between characteristics we all share
and those that we do not. This concerns the difference between those classifi-
catory schemata for which most of us will pass through the various classifica-
tions and those schemata for which we will not. For example, most of us, at
different times in our life, will be children, young adults, middle aged, and
elderly. Most of us will not, at different times in our life, be Christian, Jewish,
Muslim, Sikh, Hindu, and Buddhist. Again, though, this specification is no
good for defending the discrepancy: both race and species fall on the ‘un-
shared’ side. All of us have both a species and a race, but these stick with us
throughout our lives—or, if they do not, it is generally because things change
around us. (Both species and race classifications are fluid in the sense that
members of a species or a race are subject to being reclassified by others.)
And while people can and do identify (or be identified) with multiple races,
similar can be true of species. For example, scientists disagree about species
classifications, some individuals seem to fall between multiple species (such as
interspecies hybrids, members of ‘ring species’, etc), and so on. There is no
one who will be or is all or most races—and there is no one who will be or is
all or most species.
The most plausible basis for distinguishing race and species as characteris-
tics for the purposes of hate-speech legislation, then, is on the grounds that
one of them is a ‘constitutive characteristic’ and one is a ‘peripheral character-
istic’. Specifically, we might argue that race is constitutive of an individual’s
identity, while species is not. The argument may go that species membership
is like whether someone’s ears are attached, or whether she can roll her
tongue. These are features that we have, and features that may distinguish us,
but (unlike race) they are not features that make us who we are. The first thing
21 ibid 313.
22 ibid.


















































































to say is that the argument cannot be that race is constitutive for all individu-
als. Plausibly, there are some individuals for whom race is not a significant
part of their identity, and that fact alone cannot be sufficient to disqualify
hate-speech laws censuring racist speech. Nor can the claim be that only those
for whom race is a constitutive part of their identity warrant protection from
racist hate speech. It is unclear how this would work in practice, and it has
some deeply undesirable consequences. Iris Young, for example, uses the ex-
ample of Jews in Vichy France who had lost their identity as Jews, but who
were starkly reminded of it when faced with Nazis.23 The concept of thrown-
ness, which Young borrows from Martin Heidegger, is instructive. We find our-
selves thrown into identities and positions. It is perverse to suggest that these
Jews would not warrant the protection of hate-speech laws. Similarly, it would
be perverse to suggest that very young children without any sense of their race
are not entitled to the protection of hate-speech laws. Consequently, the argu-
ment must be that race is a constitutive part of the identities of some signifi-
cant number of individuals, while species is not. It could be this that makes it
appropriate to censure the WDL, but not the HDL.
But, even if we accept its salience for the sake of argument, constitutiveness
fails to distinguish species from race: quite simply, species identity is constitu-
tive to the identities of many individuals. Many animals clearly recognise
themselves as belonging to a particular kind—birds of a feather, as the saying
goes, flock together. This is obvious, and perhaps best demonstrated by its
exceptions. Stories of dogs who ‘think’ they are cats are charming, while sto-
ries of narwhals swimming with belugas are intriguing. The norm, of course,
is that dogs ‘think’ they are dogs, cats ‘think’ they are cats, narwhals swim
with narwhals, and belugas swim with belugas.
The defender of the discrepancy might say that this does not prove anything
about the identity of these animals—no dogs identify as dogs or cats, no nar-
whals identify as narwhals or belugas. But there is clearly at least one kind of
being for whom species membership is frequently constitutive of identity:
humans. Anthropocentric attitudes are at the core of many religious under-
standings of what makes us us, and, indeed, many non-religious conceptions of
the same. It is, perhaps, no coincidence that many people reject religious con-
ceptions of the world by affirming humanism.
Let us summarise this subsection. It might seem obvious that race and spe-
cies are not analogous for the purposes of hate-speech legislation, and so that
a ‘formal’ difference between them can justify a difference in treatment in
hate-speech law. We have canvassed five ‘formal’ reasons to exclude certain
characteristics from the protection of hate-speech law. Four evidently do not
serve to distinguish species and race as characteristics. A fifth might: it may
seem that race is constitutive of the identities of many, while species is not.
23 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (first published 1990, Princeton UP, 2011) 46.


















































































This, however, does not stand up to scrutiny: species, too, is core to the iden-
tities of many individuals. Unless other formal criteria can be identified to
catergorise race and species as characteristics (respectively) appropriately war-
ranting and appropriately not warranting the protection of hate-speech law,
this defence of the discrepancy fails.
What this subsection has not demonstrated is that race and species are
analogous for any purpose other than this. Nor has it demonstrated that there
might not be other—non-formal—reasons to differentiate race and species for
the purpose of hate-speech legislation.
C. The Targeted Groups Are Not Analogous
It could be that there is a disanalogy between the WDL and the HDL, but
that this comes down to the differences between the particular race/species
groups targeted, and not differences between the categories of ‘race’ and ‘spe-
cies’. So, to use an unrelated example, it could be that women are appropri-
ately protected by hate-speech legislation while men are not. Although, in
formal terms, the groups ‘men’ and ‘women’ are analogous, the way that mem-
bers of the groups are (or historically have been) treated may constitute a rele-
vant difference between them. Our question is the following: are there
important differences between the group ‘non-white people’ (as targeted by
the WDL) and the group ‘non-human animals’ (as targeted by the HDL) that
justify protecting the former, but not the latter, using hate-speech legislation?
Again, we acknowledge multitudinous differences between these two
groups—but (again) the existence of difference does not undermine the possi-
bility of drawing analogies. The pertinent question is whether there is a salient
difference between the groups that justifies treating one, but not the other, as
warranting the protection of hate-speech laws.
When seeking objective means for selecting groups that warrant protection
under hate-speech law beyond formal criteria, we can borrow from the
broader literature on hate crimes, which adopts two strategies.24 The first is to
identify minority groups; the second is to identify vulnerable groups. The ques-
tion, then, is whether the group targeted by the WDL could fairly be differen-
tiated from the group targeted by the HDL on the grounds of minority status
or vulnerability.
In this literature, and more broadly in the social sciences, minority does not
refer to relative numbers; instead, the focus is on the structural inequalities
faced by the group. So, while national or ethnic minorities are paradigm exam-
ples, because of the structural inequalities experienced by members of differ-
ent groups, talk of women (qua women), LGBTQ people (qua LGBTQ
people), or disabled people (qua disabled people) as members of minorities is
24 Joanna Botha, ‘The Selection of Victim Groups in Hate-Crime Legislation’ (2019) 136 SALJ 781, 803.


















































































now relatively familiar. But if we define ‘minority’ relative to structural in-
equality, it is hard to see why animals should not be included.25 Animals cer-
tainly seem to be captured, for example, by straightforward definitions of
minority groups as ‘social groups that are oppressed or stigmatized on the
basis of racial, ethnic, biological, or other characteristics’.26
But, it may be objected, animals are not captured by more sophisticated
definitions of minority groups. A classic account comes from Louis Wirth:
A minority group is any group of people who, because of their physical or cultural
characteristics, are singled out from the others in the society in which they live for
differential and unequal treatment, and who therefore regard themselves as objects of
collective discrimination.27
The problem is twofold. First, many might claim that animals are excluded from
this understanding because they are not people, since people means ‘humans’.
But such a move seems overly stipulative and ad hoc. Why should the definition
be limited to humans in this way? For the purposes of this definition, at least, it
seems just as reasonable to suppose that animals are people, too. Second, ani-
mals may seem to be excluded because they do not, so far as we know, ‘regard
themselves as objects of collective discrimination’. But this is a problematic way
to limit the definition, for two reasons. The first recalls Young’s words of the pre-
vious subsection: individuals can find themselves thrown into a group, discovering
that they have always already been a member, even if they did not realise it. This
means that one can be a member of a group without regarding oneself as a mem-
ber of the group (or as the object of collective discrimination). Second, just as
animals cannot conceive of themselves as objects of collective discrimination, so
many humans cannot conceive of themselves as such. For example, very young
children lack awareness of discrimination they face, but we nonetheless would
not want to deny that they can be members of a minority group. Thus, the fact
that animals fail to meet the letter of Wirth’s account of a minority group should
not stop us identifying them as such.
We conclude that the notion of a ‘minority group’ is not a helpful one for
justifying the discrepancy between the treatment of the WDL and the HDL,
and turn to our other candidate criterion.
Could it be, then, that non-white people are members of a vulnerable group,
while animals are not? Joanna Botha, drawing upon Jon Garland,28 identifies
vulnerable groups by asking
25 Edward Ludwig and Dale Jamieson, ‘Animals as a Minority’ (1981) 5 Humanity & Society 246.
26 John Scott, ‘Minority Group’ in A Dictionary of Sociology (4th edn, OUP 2015).
27 Louis Wirth, ‘The Problem of Minority Groups’ in Ralph Linton (ed), The Science of Man in the World
Crisis (OUP 1945).
28 Jon Garland, ‘It’s a Mosher Just Been Banged for No Reason: Assessing the Victimisation of Goths and
the Boundaries of Hate Crime’ (2010) 17 International Review of Victimology 159.


















































































whether the group (a) is a distinct social outgroup, (b) which endures repeated tar-
geting as victims of abuse or discrimination, (c) is prone to stranger crimes, and (d)
experiences the impact of hate crimes in a way which undermines the social confi-
dence of the individual victims.29
Nonhuman animals clearly represent a distinct social outgroup (a), and clearly
face repeated violent abuse and discrimination at human hands because of
their membership in that outgroup (b). Animals are prone to stranger crimes
(c) insofar as they often face illegal violence at the hands of humans they have
never met before—for example, cows abused by overworked slaughterpersons,
wild animals poached, or companion animals poisoned by those who regard
them as pests.
But do animals experience the impact of hate crimes in a way that under-
mines their ‘social confidence’ (d)? At first sight, it might seem not. This
could justify the discrepancy between our reactions to the WDL and to the
HDL: the former target a vulnerable victim group, the latter do not.
There are two responses that can be offered. The first is that some animals
do seem to have their social confidence eroded because of their awareness of
the risk of violence. ‘Game’ animals who learn to avoid humans or companion
animals who have suffered abuse could be described as individuals whose social
confidence has been eroded because of fear of attack. If correct, this would
mean that (at least some) animals are part of a vulnerable group, warranting
relevant protective laws as such. The second response echoes concerns stated
previously. There are some humans who lack the cognitive capacities for their
social confidence to be eroded by knowledge of hate crimes. Mental illness, de-
velopmental disability, or neuroatypicality, for example, could result in individ-
uals being impacted by knowledge of hate crimes (if any) in ways different to
many other adults. But it would be a surprising, even disturbing, conclusion
that these individuals cannot make up vulnerable victim groups for the pur-
poses of hate crimes. After all, it is well established that the mentally ill, the dis-
abled, and neurodivergent individuals are the victims of hate crimes. The fact
that some mentally ill, mentally disabled, or neurodivergent individuals may ex-
perience knowledge of hate crimes (if any) differently to others should not
change that. Similarly, the fact that animals may not be impacted by knowledge
of their membership in a vulnerable group should not stop us recognising that
they are vulnerable.
This subsection has asked whether the fact that non-white people are mem-
bers of a ‘minority group’ or a ‘vulnerable group’, while animals are not, could
justify the discrepancy. We have concluded that it cannot.
29 Botha (n 24) 805.


















































































3. Harm-Based Defences of the Discrepancy
A. The Harm of Wounding
Perhaps the most obvious type of harm putatively inflicted by hate speech
derives from the psychological distress and mental pain it can cause. As
Richard Delgado famously put it, there are some ‘words that wound’.30 For
example, racial slurs, epithets, and insults can lead to humiliation, isolation,
and self-loathing. Furthermore, these psychological effects often result in fur-
ther harms through their impact on bodily health and livelihoods. If this kind
of ‘psychological wounding’ is an important harm of hate speech, it could be
a means to differentiate the WDL and the HDL: the actions of the former
cause mental anguish to non-white people, but the actions of the latter cause
no such wounding to animals.
The feature of the wounding words approach that offers support for the dis-
crepancy is its subjectivity. Taking the wounding-words account as given, we
see that, from the perspective of (actually existing) animals, the HDL’s actions
are non-wounding, as they are not comprehensible.31 From the perspective of
(many) non-white people, however, the WDL’s actions are both comprehen-
sible and wounding. But while the account’s subjectivity can support the dis-
crepancy, it can also introduce problems.
First, there are what we might call ‘false negatives’—victims of (what seems
to be) hate speech who are nonetheless not wounded. We say this because
(both in fact and in theory) some targets of hate speech are not wounded by
the words, but are instead unaware of them (or aware of them but merely
angered, motivated, or amused). It would be bizarre and impractical to say
that wounding words are appropriately censured only if they actually wound—
among other problems, this would mean that even the most egregious instan-
ces of hate speech would be permissible if, for whatever reason, no one was
hurt by what was said.
The significance of this is that the WDL could, in theory, conduct a leaflet-
ing campaign in such a way that no one who would be wounded by their leaf-
lets was given one and those who received the leaflets kept this fact to
themselves. Nonetheless, intuitively, their leafleting remains problematic. The
advocate of the wounding words approach could bite this bullet, allowing that
this WDL leafleting campaign should be permitted. We suspect, however, that
30 Richard Delgado, ‘Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling’
(1982) 17 Harv CR-CL Law Rev 133.
31 We allow that some speech acts targeting some animals could be wounding. Animals could potentially be
wounded by the action of speech rather than the content of speech. For example, an animal may be wounded by
sudden loud shouting, regardless of what is said—a surprise yell of ‘Precious puss!’ may well be much more dis-
turbing than a muttered ‘Repulsive creature!’ Perhaps, too, some animals could come to associate particular
words with unpleasant experiences—a dog brutally ‘disciplined’ could perhaps be wounded by the phrase ‘Bad
dog!’ But this is all far removed from the kinds of cases we are presently exploring.


















































































they would not want to. And refusing to bite this bullet could have consequen-
ces for anti-animal hate speech.
One way that a wounding approach could deal with the challenge of false
negatives is to introduce something like a test of ‘hypothetical universalizabil-
ity’.32 This would mean noting (to adapt Joel Feinberg’s words, first used in a
different but related context) that people would be wounded by leaflets target-
ing ‘their own race, religion, or ethnic group’,33 and thus allowing (again para-
phrasing Feinberg) that
When a contemplated action is predictably likely to wound virtually any person who
might happen to behold it (or would wound nearly any person who found himself the
target of a similar affront, when the wounding is aimed more narrowly), then there is a
very powerful case for forbidding it.34
While this satisfactorily overcomes the problems of false negatives, it also
opens the door to protecting animals from the HDL’s leafleting. Given hypo-
thetical universalisability, any anti-animal hate speech that would be wounding
to the audience if animals were replaced by some minority group of which they were
members would be as serious as the speech that actually targets the minority
group of which they are members. Thus, if hypothetical universalisability is
accepted, the wounding approach is powerless to differentiate between the
WDL and the HDL, even if (as it happens) animals are not wounded by the
HDL’s speech.
Might there be other ways for the wounding-words account to deal with
false negatives? One possibility would be to hold simply that words deemed
sufficiently likely to wound should be subject to censure. This strategy could
avoid biting the bullet that a non-wounding HDL leafleting campaign is legit-
imate. At the same time, and unlike the invocation of hypothetical universalis-
ability, it would mean that animals would not be protected. After all, we can
be sure that animals will not be wounded by words that they cannot
understand.
But the success of this strategy in dealing with false negatives is mixed. It
can deal with some false negatives, such as those cases in which no one is
wounded by some fluke. But there are other false negatives that this ‘suffi-
ciently likely to wound’ approach cannot resolve. So, for example, if the WDL
deliberately planned a leafleting campaign so that they could spread their lit-
erature only to white people sympathetic to their message, they could argue
that not only was no one actually wounded, no one was likely to be wounded.
And, to draw upon a recurring concern, many young children and people with
32 Joel Feinberg, Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Volume 2. Offense to Others (OUP 1988) 30.
33 Adapted from ibid, emphasis Feinberg’s.
34 Adapted from ibid 30–1, emphasis added.


















































































various disabilities will not understand (and thus not be wounded by35) hate-
ful speech.36 Thus, an advocate of the wounding words approach could justify
the discrepancy, but at considerable cost. This leads us to believe that the
more defensible version of the wounding words approach would draw upon
hypothetical universalisability—and thus, in principle, protect animals.
There is another side to the puzzle of the wounding-words account’s sub-
jectivity. This is the question of ‘false positives’—cases in which individuals
(quite predictably) experience psychological ill effects from speech acts that
could not reasonably be described as ‘hateful’ (in the technical or colloquial
sense). Take, for example, rejections in the romantic arena.37 We do not raise
this further concern with the account’s subjectivity because we are arguing
that the wounding-words approach should be rejected. Such a claim is obvi-
ously beyond the scope of this article. We simply note that, in responding to
this puzzle, we are pushed towards making an identification of wrongful action
not on the subjective feelings they produce, but on the wrongful content of the
speech itself.38 (The importance of this, of course, is that it is a step away
from the very subjectivity that allowed the wounding-words approach to offer
a foundation for the discrepancy in the first place.) But any more objective ap-
proach seems to immediately run into difficulties. We have already seen that
to claim that the HDL’s speech is more defensible or truthful than the WDL’s
is to beg the question. The next subsection thus reviews a different way in
which to identify an objective basis for the harms caused by the WDL and
HDL.
B. The Harm of Inculcating a Hostile Environment
Some scholars have argued that the real harm in hate speech is indirect.39
Hateful speech acts can create a ‘hostile environment’, which acts as a ‘tinder-
box’ not only for violent attacks and assaults, but other important harms, too.
Furthermore, if these speech acts can take place without challenge, they may
be normalised, thereby encouraging others to engage in similar behaviours.40
The resulting climate of hatred can
35 Leaving aside the possibility that the individuals are wounded by the way the message is delivered as a dif-
ferent matter. See n 31.
36 Perhaps others will be wounded by awful things said about these people—but this could be true of animals,
too. In any case, it seems to miss the point. One of the things that favours the wounding-words account is the
intuitive appeal of the thought that hate speech is wrong because of wrongs done to those it targets.
37 Consider also fair assessments (say, frank criticism of someone’s too-ambitious career plans), challenges of
deeply held beliefs (such as ‘blasphemous’, though dispassionate and objective, rejections of the sanctity of cer-
tain figures), and innocuous trigger words in even placid environments (such as words that remind individuals
of traumatic experiences). If the hurt felt in response to hate speech is enough to justify sanction of that sort of
speech, why not the hurt felt in response to these other kinds of speech? Again, we are not claiming that this
issue cannot be overcome, simply observing that the account’s subjectivity raises some interesting questions.
38 Jeffrey Howard, ‘Free Speech and Hate Speech’ (2019) 22 Annual Review of Political Science 93, 103.
39 See Brown, ‘The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006’ (n 10).
40 Rae Langton, ‘The Authority of Hate Speech’ in John Gardner, Leslie Green, and Brian Leiter (eds),
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law, vol 3 (OUP 2018).


















































































cause members of the targeted group to be more likely to face discrimination in the
work place, to be excluded from the political process and the top positions in society,
to be ignored in matters of social justice, to find it more difficult to gain access to
education, housing and health care, to be more likely to experience mistreatment at
the hands of the police, to suffer miscarriages of justices, and so on.41
Perhaps we can differentiate the WDL from the HDL, then, by saying that
the WDL’s speech creates and sustains an environment that is conducive to
violence, discrimination and other forms of injustice, whereas the HDL’s does
not.
Of course, the problem with identifying the harm of hate speech in this way
is that it is very hard to substantiate empirically. For one, it is extremely diffi-
cult to know that any speech acts do cause the creation and maintenance of
this kind of climate of fear, rather than other factors.42 Furthermore, for our
purposes, we have no way of knowing that the WDL’s speech will create a
more hostile environment for its targets than the HDL’s, for while members of
racial minorities suffer seriously from violence, discrimination and injustice, so
too do animals. Indeed, tens of billions of animals are bred, confined in terrible
conditions and slaughtered in infancy every year throughout the world.43 This
is exactly what the leaflets circulated by the HDL—and real-world groups like
them—seek to defend. Given this, there seems no obvious way by which we
can say that the causal links between speech acts and a hostile climate are
clearer for racist speech in comparison to speciesist speech. Perhaps, if any-
thing, anti-animal speech causes even more suffering overall. For example, the
HDL’s leaflets encourage people to be unworried about everyday practices
that already routinely contribute to considerable harm to animals (for ex-
ample, through buying products produced via intensive animal agriculture).
The WDL’s leaflets, on the other hand, encourage attitudes and practices
which are not widely shared in most communities, and hence are far more
likely to ignored.
One could object that there is something bizarre about challenging the cre-
ation of a hostile environment for animals when animals are already treated so
badly at human hands—when we are already, in Dinesh Wadiwel’s words,
waging a war against animals.44 Animals, perhaps, have little to lose by the
creation of an environment hostile to them, while members of racial minorities
have a great deal to lose by the creation of an environment hostile to them.
We offer a two-part response to this objection. First, while animals are rou-
tinely exploited in all contemporary societies on a massive scale, things could
41 Brown, ‘The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006’ (n 10) 13.
42 Robert Mark Simpson, ‘Dignity, Harm and Hate Speech’ (2013) 32 Law and Philosophy 701, 723.
43 This number refers to the number of terrestrial vertebrates killed for food according to the Food and
Agricultural Organisation of the UN <http://www.fao.org/faostat/>. It does not include the many more non-ter-
restrial animals and invertebrates killed for food. Nor does it include animals killed for other purposes.
44 Dinesh Joseph Wadiwel, ‘The War Against Animals: Domination, Law and Sovereignty’ (2009) 18 GLR
283.


















































































get worse for them. For example, additional animal farming operations could
be rolled out, processing even greater numbers of animals. Furthermore, the
intensity of the practices within those operations could increase, perhaps
through politicians rolling back existing (modest) animal-welfare protections.
Second, we accept that this article might usefully be read as an argument
suited to a more ideal world: that is, one in which our war against animals has
come to an end. If so, then we are perhaps asking what future laws governing
human/animal relationships might look like, as was noted earlier. And yet, as
will be explored later, instituting bans on speciesist hate speech might help in-
culcate more benign human–animal relations within society; to put it another
way, such bans may be part of our route to that more ideal world.45
C. The Harm of Denying Membership
Jeremy Waldron’s theory of hate speech draws on the ideas of a wounding and
hostile environment, but develops them in interesting ways. Crucially, his
claims about the ‘harms of hate speech’ provide two important possible
resources for differentiating the WDL from the HDL. First, and in keeping
with the hostile environment claims discussed in the previous subsection,
Waldron explicitly attempts to ground the harm in hate speech in something
objective. For him, the harm lies in the fact that such speech denies an individ-
ual’s equal status or civic ‘dignity’.46 Hate speech, for Waldron, comprises
those forms of communication that express intense antipathy towards some
group, or towards individuals because they share some affiliation with that
group.47 It is harmful, according to Waldron, because it undermines the recog-
nition of those individuals as equal members of the community. He thus sees
hate speech as a form of ‘group defamation’: it not only denigrates certain
individuals on the basis of their belonging to certain groups, but attacks their
reputation as individuals with equal membership, rights, standing, and belong-
ing in that community.48
But why does Waldron regard the harm caused by this assault on ‘dignity’
to be a proper basis for state sanction? This comes down to Waldon’s vision of
what a ‘good society’ requires. He argues that a ‘well-ordered society’ must
formally acknowledge the equal standing of all its members. However, he also
claims that it must go further than this; members not only have an interest in
possessing formal status and rights, but also in being treated as if they have
that status and those rights.49 The ‘assurance’ that we get from knowing that
45 Notwithstanding the point that we remain agnostic on the question of whether there should be laws
against hate speech at all.
46 Waldron’s use of dignity is rather unusual, and very much relates to political status grounded in member-
ship of a community as opposed to moral status grounded in the type of being that one is.
47 Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (n 5) 57.
48 ibid 61.
49 ibid 85.


















































































we can go about our business without being humiliated and denigrated is an
important public good, according to Waldron. Crucially, he points out that it
is especially important for members of those minority groups who have been
openly despised by some in their community in the past, and who have only
attained their formal equal standing recently.50 For this reason, Waldron
argues that we all have a duty to establish and maintain a ‘visible environment’
that explicitly and implicitly provides this assurance. As such, the state has a
duty to prevent those forms of speech that assault the dignity of some of its
members.51
At first blush, it might appear as though Waldron’s theory provides a plaus-
ible basis for differentiating between the WDL and the HDL. For one, ani-
mals are not individuals with equal social standing in any community, thus
they do not possess the political status that Waldron thinks hate-speech laws
ought to protect.
In our view, however, this is too hasty: the best reading of Waldron’s theory
must include certain animals within its protective remit. To explain, let us ac-
knowledge the fact that no political community recognises animals as mem-
bers with equal social standing. In all existing political communities, animals
have a second-class status in comparison to humans. That can mean that ani-
mals are mere property—commodities that can be bred, raised, confined,
traded, and killed for the benefit of humans.52 And even among those jurisdic-
tions that have explicitly declared that animals are more than mere property,53
that have declared that they have a value of their own as sentient creatures54
and have enacted animal-welfare laws restricting certain harmful ways in
which animals can be treated, none has come close to prohibiting the horrors
of intensive animal agriculture, let alone recognising that animals have equal
standing in the community. It is further true that some states have enacted
constitutional provisions for the sake of animals, some of which explicitly rec-
ognise the ‘dignity’ of animals.55 But, again, none of these provisions acknowl-
edges that animals possess the Waldronian sense of civic dignity: none views
animals as possessing equal social standing, membership, status, and rights.
No community truly regards its animal residents as members of society, and
none recognises them as equals.
It certainly seems, then, that the HDL’s leafleting does not harm animals in
the way Waldron is interested in; it does not assault their dignity, for the
50 ibid 5–6.
51 ibid 101–3.
52 Gary Francione, Animals, Property and the Law (Temple UP 1995).
53 See eg ‘Animals in France Finally Recognized as Living, Sentient Beings’ (RT News, 29 January 2015)
<https://on.rt.com/fv7zwj> accessed 6 October 2020.
54 See art 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union <eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html>
accessed 6 October 2020.
55 See Jessica Eisen and Kirsten Stilt (2016) ‘Protection and Status of Animals’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum, Frauke
Lachenmann, and Rainer Grote (eds), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Comparative Constitutional Law
<oxcon.ouplaw.com/home/MPECCOL> accessed 6 October 2020.


















































































simple reason that animals do not possess dignity as Waldron defines the
term. But while we believe that this is the conclusion that Waldron himself
would likely draw in relation to hate speech and animals,56 we do not believe
that it is correct. One question that is immediately raised by this analysis is
whether animals should have the kind of dignity that Waldron puts at the heart
of his theory of hate speech. While they might not be regarded as members of
equal social standing, should they be? One influential argument claiming that
they should has been provided by Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka.57 For
Donaldson and Kymlicka, domesticated animals should be regarded as equal
members of our communities. Unlike wild animals, many of whom live apart
from us in their own communities, domesticated animals have been deliberate-
ly brought into our communities to live, work, play, rest, and die alongside us.
Animals are a central feature of our ‘multi-species communities’, providing
care, security, companionship, food, and more to ensure the flourishing of the
societies in which they reside. Furthermore, these domesticated animals have
been bred over the centuries to possess certain characteristics that are benefi-
cial for humans. This means that these animals are usually dependent upon
humans for their own well-being. But, unlike those ‘liminal’ animals who live
within and amongst human dwellings—birds, rodents, foxes, and more—it
also means that domesticated animals can be socialised and adjust their behav-
iour to conform to certain social norms and rules. As a result of these facts,
Donaldson and Kymlicka claim that domesticated animals are entitled to
more than simply being recognised as ‘sentient beings’ with a moral status
that we have a negative duty not to impinge upon. Rather, they argue that
domesticated animals should be recognised as the members of society that
they are, with the relevant status and rights that entails.
Crucially, one need not accept every element of Donaldson and Kymlicka’s
theory to include certain animals within a Waldronian theory of hate speech.
For one, we might accept that domesticated animals ought to have equal
membership, even while denying them certain civil rights. This is because,
while Donaldson and Kymlicka believe that animals’ membership should in-
clude recognition of the rights of ‘citizenship’, such as rights to be involved in
the co-authoring of public policy, we can reject this claim while embracing
animals’ equal standing. Put simply, we can acknowledge that different indi-
viduals in a society are equal in their possession of status and rights, even
when the rights they hold might be quite different. The case of infants is in-
structive here: awarding children a set of rights different to those possessed by
most adults58—say, by denying them rights to vote or to marry and granting
56 This is based on Waldron’s own writings on animals. See eg Jeremy Waldron, One Another’s Equals: The
Basis of Human Equality (Harvard UP 2017).
57 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights (OUP 2011).
58 Claudio Lopez-Guerra, ‘Enfranchising Minors and the Mentally Impaired’ (2012) 38 Social Theory &
Practice 115.


















































































them rights to schooling and adequate parenting—does not entail rejecting
their equal membership. Alternatively, we might accept that some animals
ought to enjoy features of social membership while nevertheless denying them
equal social standing. Perhaps, and contrary to Donaldson and Kymlicka, a
hierarchical scheme of standing is the more appropriate way of recognising
animal membership. But even if this is true, a Waldronian theory of hate
speech should still protect those animal members—even if in a less stringent
way than the protection offered to full human members. After all, a denial of
animals’ membership would still constitute an assault and a harm that it is the
law’s business to address.
Furthermore, whether one follows Donaldson and Kymlicka in attributing
equal membership to animals or develops a hierarchical conception of mem-
bership, membership might be limited to only certain animals. For while
Donaldson and Kymlicka grant membership to all domesticated animals, and
some go even further to include all sentient animals,59 it is possible to take a
more parsimonious view. For instance, some argue that only those domesti-
cated animals most clearly and closely involved in our schemes of social co-
operation can meaningfully enjoy membership.60 Indeed, this more minimalist
understanding of animals as social members has some legal precedent in sev-
eral states.61 So perhaps only a relatively small number of animals—for ex-
ample, companion animals and those working alongside humans in
cooperative projects—ought to benefit from protection under the laws of hate
speech.
What matters for our purposes is not resolving these debates about the bun-
dles of rights entailed, equal or hierarchical membership, or the animals
included. Rather, what matters is the mere fact that it is plausible to think of
some animals as members with rights to political status and membership as
such. This plausibility opens their eligibility for protection via hate-speech
laws under a Waldronian theory.
But even if it is accepted that some animals should be recognised as equal
members of our communities, the fact remains that they are not. This would
seem to mark an important difference in how we view the WDL and the HDL
through Waldron’s theory. While the WDL’s leaflets act as an assault on dig-
nity in our community here and now, the HDL’s do not. One response would
argue that it does not matter whether animals are recognised as members of our
society; they are members nonetheless.62 However, such a stark response is
59 Cochrane (n 14).
60 Elizabeth Anderson, ‘Animal Rights and the Values of Nonhuman Life’ in Cass Sunstein and Martha
Nussbaum (eds), Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions (OUP 2005); Kimberly Smith, Governing
Animals: Animal Welfare and the Liberal State (OUP 2012); Laura Valentini, ‘Canine Justice: An Associative
Account’ (2013) 62 Political Studies 37.
61 Will Kymlicka, ‘Social Membership: Animal Law Beyond the Property/Personhood Impasse’ (2017) 40
Dalhousie Law Journal 123.
62 This is explicitly argued by Donaldson and Kymlicka in ‘Animals in Political Theory’ in Linda Kalof (ed),
The Oxford Handbook of Animal Studies (OUP 2017); see also Smith, Governing Animals (n 60).


















































































unnecessary. Waldron’s theory is not simply about vindicating what a society
accepts, but helping realise what it ought to be.63 On his view, hate speech
prohibits progress towards a well-ordered society, and laws prohibiting it can
help to create the attitudes and environment necessary to uphold dignity for
all.64 In response to those who argue against restrictions on hate speech, argu-
ing that the views expressed should be left to wither away in the free market-
place of ideas, Waldron writes: ‘Societies do not become well-ordered by
magic. The expressive and disciplinary work of law may be necessary as an in-
gredient in the change of heart within its racist citizens that a well-ordered so-
ciety presupposes.’65 And if this logic works in the case of human members of
our society, then it will work in the case of animal members. Their member-
ship will not just happen by magic; the law—including prohibitions on speech
acts like the HDL’s—can be a necessary ingredient in moving towards the
good society.66
D. The Harm of Undermining Assurance
There is a further Waldronian ground for differentiating between the WDL
and the HDL, and it is one that resonates with our prior discussion of wound-
ing. As we have seen, Waldron’s theory rests not only on members not having
their dignity assaulted, but their being ‘assured’ of not having it undermined
within their community. Waldron argues that it is vital that individuals can go
about their daily lives secure in the knowledge that they will not have their
standing undermined by speech that denigrates and abuses them. Most ani-
mals, however, cannot understand speech acts that attack their status, such as
those of the HDL, making it unclear how they can be harmed by them.
Once again, however, we find that a closer reading of Waldron’s theory
shows this objection to be misconceived. Waldron is quite explicit that the
harms of hate speech cannot be reduced to the feelings they produce; rather,
they are about the actual effects they have on individuals’ standing:
The distinction is in large part between objective or social aspects of a person’s stand-
ing in society, on the one hand, and subjective aspects of feeling, including hurt,
63 Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (n 5) 79–82.
64 cf Simpson (n 42) 722–3.
65 Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (n 5) 81.
66 Their being necessary need not mean that it is wise to introduce them immediately. Again, it may be help-
ful to view our arguments as philosophy of law for a more ideal world. Perhaps, for example, we find the liber-
ation of members of racial minorities and of nonhuman animals on different timelines (a phrase suggested to us
by Sue Donaldson). Perhaps we are at the point where the institution of hate speech laws can help push us to-
wards just race relations, but we are not at the same point when it comes to interspecies relations. For instance,
we may think that there is a relevant difference in practice (if not in theory) between the levels of responsibility
that can be attributed to individuals for engaging in hate speech targeting members of racial minorities and hate
speech targeting animals. We may think it questionable to criminally sanction people for expressing views that
are very commonly held in their society, even if said expression is just as harmful as the expression of certain
views not commonly held that are criminally sanctioned. We thank Will Kymlicka for prompting these ideas.


















































































shock, and anger, on the other. A person’s dignity or reputation has to do with how
things are with respect to them in society, not with how things feel to them.67
None of this is meant to deny the felt aspects of assaults on dignity experi-
enced by many humans, which are real and profound; instead, it is to say that
it is the attack on dignity that constitutes the harm, not the feelings it produ-
ces. To illustrate his point, Waldron draws on the concepts of ‘degradation’
and ‘defamation’. In most cases, degrading treatment produces a great deal of
hurt and shame. However, even in those exceptional cases where it does not,
the harm is nonetheless real. And while defamation also usually results in feel-
ings of distress, it is the assault on reputation that constitutes the harm, not
the feelings the assault evokes.68
The harm that hate speech can have independently of any feelings of deg-
radation on the part of the speech’s target can be illustrated by the opening
examples in Waldron’s book. When he talks of the effect of hate speech, he
talks not just of the effect it has on the target of the speech; there is a second
audience. Racist graffiti, for example, speaks not simply to members of the ra-
cial minority, but to the racial majority, especially those who themselves har-
bour racist sentiments. To these people, Waldron claims, it says:
We know that some of you agree that these people are not wanted here. We know
that some of you feel that they are dirty (or dangerous or criminal or terrorist).
Know now that you are not alone. Whatever the government says, there are enough
of us around to make sure these people are not welcome. There are enough of us
around to draw attention to what these people are really like. Talk to your neighbors,
talk to your customers. And above all, don’t let any more of them in.69
The standing of members of the minority is thus undercut, as—regardless
of their own feelings on the matter—members of the majority are reminded
and assured that members of the minority are not really members, that they
do not really belong, that they are not really equals.
One problem with Waldron’s position here is that it might seem to be col-
lapsing into a claim about ‘hostile environments’, whose problems as a justifi-
cation of the discrepency we examined earlier. But even leaving that aside,
there remain problems with using it to differentiate between the HDL’s and
WDL’s leaflets. For if the harm of hateful speech lies in the fact that it under-
mines a group’s status, rather than the feelings of the targeted group, then
both leafleting campaigns must be censured. After all, the HDL do not speak
to animals—they speak to humans, seeking to assure them of their superiority,
of their right to use animals for their purposes, and so on. Since the HDL’s
speech serves to provide arguments to undermine the worth and standing of
animals, it straightforwardly seems to constitute an assault on dignity, and the
67 Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (n 5) 106.
68 ibid 109–10.
69 ibid 2–3.


















































































type of harm that the law should be concerned with under these kinds of
theories.
4. Conclusion
We have reviewed a range of reasons to think that those engaging in racist
hate speech should be subject to legislative censure while those engaging in
speciesist hate speech should not. We have found all such reasons wanting.
We accept that our arguments will not convince everyone. Readers who
completely reject the idea of animal rights or animal membership, for ex-
ample, will be able to find resources to justify treating the leaflets of the WDL
and HDL very differently. But while there is not the room in this article to
offer a full-blown defence of either animal rights or animal membership, we
hope that they are sufficiently plausible for readers to accept that we have
raised important questions about the scope of hate-speech laws.
Furthermore, we have not reviewed every possible theory outlining the
wrongness of hate speech or the justifiability of hate-speech legislation. We
have said nothing, for instance, about offence.70 However, we believe that we
have addressed the most plausible ways that the discrepancy might be justi-
fied. Thus, though we allow that there may be some other way to justify the
discrepancy between responses to racist and speciesist hate speech, we do not
know what this would be.71
Finally, we acknowledge that even if the harmfulness of hate speech (racist
or speciesist) provides a prima facie reason to support the criminalisation of
said speech, it is plausible that, all things considered, criminalisation is not
justified. Perhaps, for example, the harms of criminalisation would be signifi-
cant enough to counterbalance the harms criminalisation seeks to avert. Or
70 Though the HDL’s conduct, unlike the WDL’s conduct, is unlikely to cause a great deal of offence, the
offensiveness of hate speech is rarely seriously proposed as a reason to criminalise it. Joel Feinberg, who argues
for the legitimacy of the criminalisation of offensive conduct, would likely not support criminalising the conduct
of the WDL anyway, as he sees the sincere and civil expression of opinion as ‘a kind of trump card’. No matter
how odious an opinion, he argues, expressing it is permissible. See Feinberg (n 32) 39.
71 It is worth acknowledging, too, that this methodology may be the wrong way to go about this. Puzzling
through the many and various ways that hate-speech law could be justified (and the many and various apparent
counter-examples to justifications for hate-speech law) might miss the significance of hate speech. Perhaps, it
could be countered, it is the whole of (racist, sexist) hate speech that justifies censure, rather than any particular
constituent part. We are reminded of the words of Robert Nozick, a noted philosopher sympathetic to the plight
of animals who nonetheless questioned the anti-speciesism of animal rights theory. ‘We think of humans,’
Nozick wrote, ‘as part of the multifarious texture of human history and civilizations, human achievements, and
human family relations. Animals . . . we see against a different background and texture. The differences are enor-
mous and endless.’ The mistake, Nozick argues, that animal-rights theorists make is assuming that ‘something
much simpler than the total differences between two rich tapestries (one richer than the other) will, by itself,
constitute the morally relevant difference’. It could be that something similar is true of hate speech: there is a
difference between anti-animal hate speech and (inter alia) racist hate speech, but it cannot be stated succinctly.
This challenge, Nozick fears, is unanswerable: philosophers simply have not yet developed the tools to assess
wholes in this way. See Robert Nozick, Socratic Puzzles (Harvard UP 1997) 308–9. For more on Nozick and ani-
mals, see Josh Milburn, ‘Robert Nozick on Nonhuman Animals: Rights, Value and the Meaning of Life’ in
Andrew Woodhall and Gabriel Garmendia da Trindade (eds), Ethical and Political Approaches to Nonhuman
Animal Issues (Palgrave Macmillan 2017).


















































































perhaps the harms of hate speech could be counterbalanced without the need
for the drastic step of criminalisation, such as through counter-speech.72
With these caveats in mind, we conclude that we have found no good rea-
son to endorse the discrepancy: either there is good reason to criminalise both
racist and speciesist hate speech or neither should be criminalised.
72 cf Corey Brettschneider, When the State Speaks, What Should It Say? (Princeton UP 2012).
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